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Introduction
Since 1976, responding to macroeconomic international variables, local political struggles
and social  conflicts,  different  phases  of  neo-liberal  inspired  market  reforms have  been
implemented in Argentina.  Four main phases can be identified,  each corresponding to a
specific economic–political context. The imposed consensus of the military dictatorship of
the period 1976-1983, the structural and fiscal adjustments of the return to democracy in
1983-1989, the massive neoliberal program of privatizations, reform of the public sector,
labour flexibility and attack on workers’ rights implemented during the 1990s but opened
by the  economic  terror of  the hyperinflation  of  1989-1990,  the  neo-developmental and
agricultural commodities export oriented model of the post 2001 crisis.
These phases have, in turn, differently affected trade unions and workers responses which
have alternated between full or partial rejection, forced or pragmatic acceptance, complicit
or explicit consensus, reflecting not just, within each of these phases, a variety of political-
ideological  or  contingent  approaches  but  also  showing  profound  differences  between
institutional and grass root based responses. This variety, which also corresponded to broad
divisions within the labour movement, does not allow for a clear cut distinction between
different trade unions’ ideological stances toward neo-liberalism.  Thus, while parts of trade
unions’ peak organizations have supported, particularly in the 1990s, government turn to
neo-liberalism, this has never been by assuming a mutual gains agenda but rather just plain
pragmatism and opportunism. On the contrary, those trade unions that have opposed neo-
liberalism have done so  either  advocating  distributive  policies  according  to  the  classic
heritage of Peronism or without a clear objective and on a short-term perspective, looking
for community wide alliances, building ad-hoc or strengthening workplace based structures,
rather  than explicitly  advocating  social  democracy or socialism as an alternative.  Thus,
although ideologies have at time come to the surface, as it happened for instance in the
1980s  Confederacion  General  del  Trabajo (henceforth  CGT)  opposition  to  IMF  and
economic  adjustment,  that  combined  the  Peronist  long-standing ideal  of  justicia  social
(social  justice)  with anti-imperialism,  there has been in general a pragmatic  rather  than
ideological character in the trade unions’ responses to neo-liberalism. 
This character, which corresponds to a certain extent also to that of trade unions’ politics in
Argentina, cannot, however, be fully comprehended without taking into account some basic
institutional, political and organizational features around which the activity of trade unions
is structured.  
First, since the rise of Peronism in the mid-40’s, the State has played a central role in the
system of industrial relations. Legislation regulates trade unions’ representation by giving
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legal recognition for the negotiation of collective agreements and representation of workers
at the workplace or in courts (the so called personería gremial), to just one organization per
industrial  sector or economic activity.  This has strengthened trade unions, introducing a
system of vertical control and the centralisation of decision-making. At the same time, a
breach of law, or ministerial  intervention,  often put trade unions at  risk of losing their
personería gremial. Besides, legislation also regulates cases in which the arbitration and
participation  of  public  authorities  is  compulsory,  as  in  the  Ministry  of  Labour  formal
approval of collective agreements, or in this latter right to force conflicting parts to accept
mediation (conciliación obligatoria), period during which both employers and trade unions
must abstain from taking actions. 
Second, most unions’ leaders belong to Peronism and form part of their political bodies and
internal disputes. This, however, have not precluded different strategic choices, even among
Peronist  unions,  in front of changing circumstances.  Thus,  informal and highly volatile
alliances, the so-called  nucleamientos sindicales, have often been formed, gathering trade
unions according to political and tactical aims regarding industrial and governmental issues
as well as leadership rivalries. 
Third, in spite of these frequent divisions, all union leaders,  Peronist  or not,   share the
defense of the legal framework of trade unions, which strengths their bargaining position
and  warrants  top-down  internal  management,  and  the  defense  of  trade  unions  health
institutions, the so called obras sociales, which provide financial and political resources to
union leaders.  Obras Sociales are perhaps, the most salient feature of Argentinian trade
unions. Through these, unions provide workers with health care, recreation centres, holiday
packages, professional education, personal loans, housing schemes, and the like. Over the
years and with the reduction of public spending associated to market reforms, the  obras
sociales have become pillars of the country’s health system and consequently a source of
power and an axis of political exchange with the State. 
Fourth,  the  legislative  framework that  empowered  trade  unions  national  structures  also
meant that their shop steward structures, the so-called comisiones internas, developed and
became stronger. While collective bargaining has tended to revolve around wage matters, in
Argentina the  comisiones internas have directly  challenged managerial  control  over  the
labour process and working conditions,  apart  from being also the only effective way of
guaranteeing the fulfillment of collective agreements at the workplace. 
In sum, the variety of trade unions reactions to neo-liberalism can also be explained by the
existence  of  a  contradictory  tendency  that  has  always  characterized  trade  unionism  in
Argentina. On the one hand, the juridification of the system of industrial relations and the
relationships between trade unions and the  Peronist political  movement has generated a
powerful bureaucracy, which often look for government support and political exchange as
means to its ends. On the other hand, grassroots worker mobilisations came to the fore time
and again,  often through the revitalisation of the  comisiones internas,  and frequently in
open confrontation with national or regional trade union leaderships. Therefore every attack
to workers’ organisations during the four neo-liberal phases mentioned above, entailed an
attack to their legal and financial underpinnings and, until 1989, an attack to Peronism, but
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also, involved the assault of comisiones internas, the grass-roots sources of workers’ power
(Atzeni and Ghigliani 2007, 2009). 
Considering this background, in the following sections we will show how these features,
specific of the history of trade unionism in Argentina, have interacted with different phases
of globally imposed neo-liberal reforms to produce a series of responses from trade unions
which, mixing pragmatism, ideology and politics, have allowed these latter organizational
survival  to  thirty  five  years  of  neo-liberal  policies  and,  more  recently,  their  renewed
political role. However, looking at the devastating effects produced by neo-liberalism on
the Argentinean working class, it is questionable the extent to which this success in the
defence of the institutional role of trade unions really corresponded to better conditions for
workers.
Neo-liberalism through repression: trade unions’ opposition to the military regime of
1976-1983
There is common agreement that the military putsch that took power in Argentina on the 24
March 1976 was a turning point in the country’s economic and social history. The climate
of violence, terror and persecution, that the military regime created in the argentine society
during the years 1976-1983 is  well  known, although much less,  it  is  the price paid by
workers’ delegates  and unions’ activists  (30% of  the  disappeared  listed  by CONADEP,
National Commission for the Disappeared). The physical repression of workers’ resistance,
the control of trade unions, the anti-labour legislation and the overall attempt to increase
productivity by imposing discipline and silencing dissent in the workplace, was the most
visibly brutal side of a project that, by dissolving trade unions’ political and social power,
wanted to entirely restructure the model of capital accumulation in Argentina. Indeed, the
first historical encounter of Argentina with a fully fledged program of neo-liberal economic
reforms cannot indeed be understood without linking the restructuring of the economy to
the physical and associational destruction of the labour movement power. 
In consequence, in considering this period, trade unions’ response to neo-liberalism should
be  seen  as  an  attempt  to  defend  workers’ historic  conquests,  their  own  organizational
survival and the ideals of wealth redistribution as embodied in the Peronist ideology of the
social  justice,  within  a  more  generalized  struggle  for  democracy.  This  main  response,
however, did not avert that a small group of union leaders collaborated with the military
rulers.
On  the  economic  front,  pressured  and  justified  by  growing  inflation,  the  military
government introduced a series of fiscal, monetary and financial reforms, all made possible
by the expansion of external debt, to liberalise the market, attract foreign investments and
increase  external  competition.  This  meant  the  abandonment  of  the  model  of  import
substitution based on the development and protection of local industries that dominated the
country’s  economy  for  over  30  years.  These  policies  caused  de-industrialisation  and
boosted  capital  concentration,  determining  an  overall  reduction  in  real  salaries  and
worsening  working  conditions  (Schvarzer  1996).  Although  not  entirely  novel  in  the
country,  the  economic  policies  of  the  military  government  set  the  foundation  of  neo-
liberalism in Argentina. 
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On the  legislative  front,  a  series  of  decrees  and  acts  suspended  collective  bargaining,
changed  the  labour  contract  favouring  employers,  increased  differences  within  salaries
scale, facilitated redundancies and layoffs, prohibited the right of strike, of any other form
of workers’ direct  action and of unions’ activities  in  the workplaces,  and paralysed the
normal functioning of national and regional trade unions’ confederations, controlling their
finances and obras sociales.
This legal contraction of workers’ rights, the disarticulation of trade unions’ organizational
power, the state’s repressive apparatus and the use of this by employers to eliminate any
form  of  dissent  in  the  workplace  (Basualdo,  V.  2006),  thus  went  together  with  the
contraction  of  employment  in  the  industrial  sector  and  the  corresponding  increase  of
outsourced, underpaid, informal work in the growing service sector (Chitarroni and Cimillo
2007).  These  economic  and  legislative  factors,  far  from  been  mutually  unintended
consequences, represented a concerted attack on established workers’ rights and on  the
political power of the trade unions’ movement which were seen as the cause of both the
political  revolutionary  and  economic  turbulence  that  preceded  the  putsch  (Fernández,
1985). In the military and political right environment were still fresh the memories of the
social mobilizations that produced the  Cordobazo, in 1969, and of the consequences that
these events produced in changing the balance of power in favour of workers both at the
workplace, contesting the authority of employers and working conditions, and in society,
obtaining a more favourable redistribution of national income; or the events of 1975, when
the associational power of workers was the major cause of the failure of the liberal and
monetarist economic plan of the government (James 1990). 
How did workers react  to the changes in employment conditions produced by the neo-
liberal economic reforms? What sort of reaction was possible in a legally restrictive and
repressive environment?  
Opinions with respect to these questions have varied, depending on the level of analysis
and on the importance given to trade unions’ mobilizations within the overall process of
opposition  to  the  dictatorship.  Some  authors,  focusing  on  the  formal  organizations  of
workers and open forms of collective action have argued for a generalised trade unions’
immobility  imposed  by  repression  (Delich  1982);  others,  instead,  have  distinguished
between a low (1976-1979) and a high (1979-1983) period of mobilizations (Abós 1984).
In  turn,  those  who  considered  the  continuous,  although  scattered  and  often  informal
workers’  protests  and  partial  strikes  in  specific  workplaces  during  the  dictatorship,
criticised the idea of immobility emphasizing the important role that the working class and
the labour movement in general, and not necessarily the trade unions as their legal activities
were in the majority of cases paralised, have had in weakening the dictatorship and creating
the conditions for the return of democracy (Pozzi 1988). 
At  the  level  of  national  trade  unions’ coordination,  with  the  CGT  banned  and  most
important  trade  unions  under  military  control,  their  leaders  jailed  and  in  a  context  of
extreme  organizational  difficulties,  divisions  emerged  between  a  confrontation and  a
participation wing, the first more prone to actively oppose the regime and to give voice to
the scattered but continuous local struggles, while the second more open to dialogue and
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negotiation with the government. These two groups operated in parallel over the course of
the period through diverse nucleamientos sindicales. The Comisión de los 25 called a first
general strike in 1979, which ended with hundreds of trade union officials and activists in
jail, and a second one in July 1981, this time as CGT (although this was still formally not
recognized by public authorities). These strikes were against the government’s economic
policy, in claim of wage increases and for the restitution of unions and obras sociales to
workers. At the same time, unions claimed for detainee and missing union activists, and the
enforcement of civil and political rights. Both times, the  Comisión Nacional de Trabajo
(CNT), which endorsed an apolitical  and servicing unionism, was against the industrial
action  and  in  favour  of  promoting  dialogue  with  military  authorities.  In  1981,  both
nucleamientos converged within the CGT but the internal struggles caused its division. The
confrontationist  CGT  increased  its  mobilizing  methods  and  organized  two  massive
demonstrations. Then, with the military forces in retreat, there would be three more general
strikes, with the involvement, in the last two, of the ‘participation’ wing of the trade union
movement  (Iñigo  Carrera  2007).  These  mobilizations  framed  the  opposition  to  neo-
liberalism together with the struggle for democracy.  
Notwithstanding the importance of the national level in coordinating opposition, certainly,
in evaluating trade unions responses to neo-liberalism under the dictatorship it is essential
to take into account the level of militancy and grass-roots activism.  Comisiones internas,
trade  unions  locals  or  simply  informal,  often  clandestine,  groups  of  workers  have,  by
defending  their  salaries  and  rights  to  work,  constantly  challenged  the  regime  and  its
economic policies, contributing to the return of democracy. The legal prohibition of any
forms of dissent, employers’ despotism and often complacency with military repression,
left workers alone and at risk in their struggles against the employers. Nevertheless, well
representing  a  recurrent  trend  in  the  history  of  argentine  trade  unionism,  that  of  the
contradictory interaction between grass-roots mobilizations and organizational bureaucracy,
workers scattered but continuous opposition strengthened coordination and representation
at national level. 
There is no doubt the last military dictatorship has been very effective in reducing what was
perceived  as  a  too  powerful  labour  movement.  The  systematic  use  of  repression,  the
physical elimination of militants, the introduction of anti-labour legislation, have all been
used to break the resistance of workers and trade unions, as these were seen as the main
obstacle to the introduction of neo-liberal market reforms. By the end of the dictatorship
unions regained political  freedom but lost  power in relations to employers.  Without the
support  of  a  peronist  government  and  in  an  employment  context  that  had  changed
consistently since 1976, trade unions remained divided, at least initially, in relation to their
approach to neo-liberalism. However, government’s attempt to use these divisions to reform
the  structure  of  trade  unionism  and  the  increasing  influence  of  international  financial
institutions in defining the economic agenda of the country helped to characterize the first
period  after  the  return  of  democracy  as  one  of  the  most  conflictive  in  the  history  of
Argentina. 
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Trade unions reactions to structural adjustments during 1983-89: general strikes and
bargained flexibility 
Workers and trade unions’ experiences of and responses to neo-liberalism during the 80’s
are  still  under-researched  compared  to  those  of  the  90’s  and this  notwithstanding  their
distinctive character. A number of important studies referring to the period have been done
during the first years of democracy. However, these lacked a long term perspective and
were mostly concentrated in evaluating the immediate effects of the last dictatorship on the
labour movement, by looking at both the process of deindustrialization and other structural
changes upon working-class composition and action (Nun 1987) and the re-organization of
the trade unions structures (Palomino 1985)
Later on, the dramatic changes introduced in the labour scene by capital restructuring and
governmental macro-economic and labour policies during the 90’s attracted the academic
interest.  These  new  studies,  dating  back  the  origins  of  neo-liberalism  to  the  policies
implemented by the  coup d’état  of 1976, either considered the first years of the return to
democracy (1983-89) as a period of continuity or as a period of impasse. But in both cases,
there was little interest  in reconstructing its specific character which stemmed from the
contradictions  arising  from  trade  unions’ broad  opposition  to  neo-liberalism  and  their
corporate and organisational interests. It was within this context that a few but influential
unions,  (grouped in the  nucleamiento sindical  Gestión y Trabajo,  a  continuation  of the
collaborationist  CNT) began to advocate the need to accept change in industrial relations
and  accommodate  their  agendas  to  neo-liberalism,  whereas  most  unions  pursued  a
traditional path and advocated import substitution industrialization policies.  Thus, rather
than a period of impasse or continuity, the years between 1983 and 1989, notwithstanding
the apparently shared political rejection of neo-liberalism, witnessed the seeds of unions
likely transformism in the face of changing circumstances. 
The return to democracy did not reverse the structural changes brought about by eight years
of neo-liberal policies and military rule. After a short attempt to reintroduce distributive
policies,  the  government  of  Raúl  Alfonsín  (Partido  Radical)  adopted,  first,  the  IMF’s
recipes  to stabilise  the economy; and then,  since the Baker  Plan (1987),  World  Bank’s
recipes to promote structural reforms. This meant the privatization of public firms, free
trade and deregulation.  According to  the government,  the idea was to promote primary
exports while simultaneously restructuring the industry towards an export oriented model
through market  liberalisation.  Nevertheless,  the development  of neo-liberal  reforms was
uneven and piecemeal during the 80’s; in fact,  most of them failed,  partly due to inter-
bourgeois conflicts, partly due to popular, and, increasingly, trade unions’ resistance. 
Between 1980-9 the GDP diminished 10 % and the capital net investment fell from 17,7%
of the GDP to -1,1%. In the midst of this recessive situation, conflicts between agrarian and
industrial  interests  and  between  local  economic  groups  and  external  creditors  doomed
official economic initiatives to failure, making difficult to deepen neo-liberal reforms. The
only  sharing  understanding  of  the  ruling  classes  was  the  need to  increase  productivity
through  working-class  exploitation.  The  ratio  real  wage/productivity  diminished  8,87%
annually over 1984-7 (Peralta Ramos 2007). Besides, real wages and the labour income
component of the GDP fell steadily. Between 1981-9, labour income was 30,2 % of the
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GDP (12,6 % less  than in  the period 1970-5);  in  1989,  this  figure descended to 24 %
(Basualdo,  E.  2006).  The worsening of  the reproductive  conditions  of  the labour  force
manifested in labour market indicators too: the unemployment rate doubled in the first five
years of the democratic government. In brief, the recovering of political and organizational
rights  for  trade  unions  was  parallel  to  the  continuing  deterioration  of  the  economic
situation, which prevented workers to achieve meaningful changes in the relative balance of
power vis-a-vis the employers.
In turn, the electoral defeat of Peronism in 1983 further complicated the recovery of trade
unions at the end of the military rule. Union leaders had played a central  role over the
presidential campaign and were blamed for the electoral failure of  Peronism. As a result,
many politicians within the Peronist Party began to advocate its de-unionisation (Levitsky
2003). Divisions within the trade union movement exacerbated the problem; at the end of
the dictatorship there were two CGTs and four nucleamientos sindicales, clear indicators of
disorganization and lack of strategic perspective. 
The Partido Radical attempted to take advantage of this situation and just a week after Raúl
Alfonsín  took  office,  the  government  sent  a  bill  to  reform trade  unions  organisational
structures. While this was justified as an attempt to introduce a more democratic system of
workers’ representation it was aimed at the same time to undermine the historical support of
trade unions for Peronism. 
The outcome would be, however, the opposite. Trade unions reorganised the CGT to face
this  new threat  and to  advocate  the  recovery  of  the  institutions  and  legal  basis  of  the
industrial relations cancelled by the dictatorship. This regained unity strengthened the CGT,
which by beginning to campaign against neo-liberal recipes it gradually ended up leading
the social opposition to the overall governmental policies. 
Between 1983 and 1989, the CGT called thirteen general strikes. Most of them had as a
main goal the refusal of governmental economic and social policies and wage increases.
Indeed, some of these general strikes were explicitly  anti-imperialist  and included mass
demonstrations. In 1985, for instance, around 120,000 people gathered to manifest against
the government’s economic plan, the payment of the foreign debt and the IMF involvement
in the design of economic plans and privatisation policies (Iñigo Carrera 2007). 
This widespread trade unions opposition rested,  however,  on the defense of an inward-
looking  import-substitution  industrialization  model,  based  on  State  intervention  and
distributive policies. This standpoint was majoritarian but, as usual, not unanimous among
trade  unions;  moreover,  within  this  orientation  there  were  also  tactic  and  strategic
differences.  A minority  of  unions,  gathered  in  Gestión  y  Trabajo,  even  presented  an
alternative plan inspired to neo-liberal principles. This nucleamiento argued for the need to
participate in the political system as an interest group subordinating union policies to the
strategic definition of the ruling elites. 
However,  during  this  period  of  return to  democracy,  more  important  than some of  the
unions argument in favour of a new, neo-liberal oriented, system of industrial relations was
the reactivation of collective bargaining. While this certainly represented a gain in terms of
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contributing  to  re-balance  power  in  favour  of  trade  unions,  it  also  opened the  door  to
exchange wage increases for flexibility and productivity. Important unions like UOM or
SMATA, representing metal and automotive workers’, that were campaigning at that time
against neo-liberal reforms as part of the CGT, by signing these agreements, left the space
open for a de facto acceptance of neo-liberalism at the workplace.
At  a  different  level,  another  sign  of  opposition  to  neo-liberal  policies,  which  would
gradually develop up to the point of division of the labour movement in the beginnings of
1990s, was the increasing militancy of public workers in Argentina caused by the external
debt-driven fiscal crisis which led to IMF imposed adjustment policies for the public sector.
Public  workers  were  the  prime  victims  and  actively  opposed  the  state  reform  and  its
consequences. In the first semester of 1984, 30 % of labour conflicts corresponded to the
public sector; in 1989, 48 %. Health workers, civil servants and teachers were among the
most active strikers (Villanueva 1994). 
Lastly, it is necessary to take into account the ideological and political consequences of the
hyperinflation processes that hit the economy in 1989–1990.  Its disciplining effects upon
the population have been stressed by scholars (Murillo 2001), and even compared to those
of  a  dictatorship  or  a  political  repression (Bonnet  2007).  Indeed,  Thwaites  Rey (2003)
argues that both the political terror implanted in the society by the dictatorship (1976–1983)
and the economic terror of the hyperinflation explained the popular tolerance to the neo-
liberal  reforms  of  the  beginnings  of  the  1990s.  This  event  brought  forward  change  at
political level and paved the way for a wide program of reforms in which privatization was
decisive. Indeed, this crisis helped to overcome the resistance of the trade union movement
that  found itself  suddenly  trapped.  The vast  majority  of  trade  unions  had been openly
against privatisation during the 80’s, but they did not want to be blamed in front of the
population for being responsible for a new hyperinflation crisis, so most of them declined
to take industrial  action.  Thus,  the economic  crisis  prepared  the terrain for making the
population accept the need for a radical change in economic policy. It was in this critical
context that the new Menem’s government passed the State Reforms and the Economic
Emergency laws which launched the political process of market reforms and privatisation.
This  meant,  to  a  large  extent,  the  final  surrender  of  the  main  political  parties  to  the
influence and the privatisation recipes of the IMF and the WB. However, it is necessary to
stress  that  the  Peronist candidate  Carlos  Menem  had  won  the  presidential  election
immediately after the hyperinflation peak of beginning of 1989 with a traditional economic
programme, advocating industrialisation and distributive policies, and the support of trade
unions. Actually, once in office, the real policies would be exactly the opposite. 
The massive neo-liberal reforms of the 1990s: privatisations, state reforms and flexibility
The juncture of 1989-1993 is crucial in the history of neo-liberalism in Argentina. During
these years,  the  agenda of  the New Right  was finally  put  into practice  in  full  through
furthering  deregulation  and  market  liberalisation,  and  a  set  of  specific  policies:  fiscal
bonuses to attract multinational investments, anti-inflationary monetary policies, reduction
of public employees, cutting public expenditures, privatisation of social security services
and labour  flexibility.  One of the pillars  of the programme was the Convertibility  Plan
introduced in 1991. By fixing the peso to the US dollar, this policy stopped hyperinflation,
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produced stability and market confidence and created consensus among bourgeois parties
and  State  bureaucracies.  However,  the  decisive  policy  was  the  privatisation  of  public
companies. Between 1990 and 1993 the Peronist government launched a fast and massive
privatisation  programme,  technically  and financially  assisted  by  the  IMF,  the  WB,  the
International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development  and  the  Inter-American
Development  Bank.  In  four  years,  the  government  sold  thirty-four  companies  and  let
concessions for nineteen services and eighty-six areas for petroleum development. Indeed,
the business of privatizations diluted the conflict between external creditors and economics
groups operating in the Argentinean market, since both participated in it. It was one of the
broadest and most rapid privatization programmes in the Western Hemisphere. Over the
implementation,  the  programme  was  backed  by  a  WB’s  Public  Enterprise  Reform
Adjustment Loan to finance lay-offs, early retirements and enterprise restructuring. 
Privatisation was accompanied  by an ideological  campaign against  public  unions.  They
were blamed for maximising salaries and benefits for themselves, at the cost of service
quality and economic efficiency, and generally as a cost to the consumers.  Indeed, the need
to curb the power of public trade unions was a topic included on the agenda of public
debates of that time. Accordingly, public enterprises underwent significant change prior to
privatisation  to  modify  public  industrial  relations  and  break  trade  unions’ capacity  to
obstruct  the managerial  decisions of the future private  owners.  To that aim,  a horde of
consultants  paid  with  the  WB  loans  were  personally  involved  in  negotiations  with
managers,  union officers,  and authorities  from the  Ministry  of  Labour,  the Ministry of
Economy and the WB. Negotiations gave very soon place to imposition as the government
suspended 718 clauses from the collective agreements previously reached by trade unions
with thirteen public enterprises.  By 1993 there had already been 280,509 jobs losses in the
public sector, with a cost to the State of 2,035 million dollars in ‘voluntary redundancy’
packages (Ghigliani 2010). 
This is certainly part of the explanation of the increase of unemployment between 1991-5,
despite the considerable growth of the GDP in the same period. The rate of unemployment
rose from 6,0 per cent in October 1991 to 16,6 per cent in same month of 1995, while
underemployment rose from 7,9 per cent to 12,5 per cent. This was surely the most striking
immediate outcome of the deepening of neo-liberalism in Argentina. Yet, every proxy to the
living  standards  of  the  working-class  between  1991  and  2001,  the  last  year  of  the
Convertibility Plan, shows the social costs of capital offensive and the intensification of the
exploitation of labour in manufacturing in a context of trade unions retreat (Table 1 and 2). 
Table 1 : Labour Market, Poverty and Wages (1991-2001)
Unemployment
%
Underemployment
%
Population
below
Poverty
%
Population
below
Indigence
%
Real salary
Average
1991=100
1991 6,0 7,9 21,5 3,0 100,0
1992 7,0 8,1 17,8 3,2 104,1
1993 9,3 9,3 16,8 4,4 105,2
1994 12,2 10,4 19,0 3,5 103,7
1995 16,6 12,6 24,8 6,3 98,9
1996 17,3 13,6 27,9 7,5 98,2
1997 13,7 13,1 26,0 6,4 97,4
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1998 12,4 13,6 25,9 6,9 95,2
1999 13,8 14,3 26,7 6,7 94,7
2000 14,7 14,6 28,9 7,7 95,2
2001 18,3 16,3 35,4 12,2 93,4
Source: Basualdo, E. (2003)
Table 2 : Manufacturing: Production, Employment, Real Wages and Productivity (1991-2001)
Year Production Employment Average Real Wage Productivity Productivity/real wage
1991 85,6 103,9 94,6 82,4 87,1
1992 96,8 103,1 98,6 93,8 95,2
1993 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
1994 104,6 97,1 101,9 107,7 105,6
1995 97,3 91,3 96,8 106,6 110,1
1996 103,5 88,1 97,3 117,5 120,7
1997 113,2 88,9 93,7 127,4 135,9
1998 115,5 87,3 92,6 132,3 142,9
1999 105,9 80,5 92,9 131,6 141,6
2000 104,6 74,9 94,3 139,7 148,1
2001 92,9 70,0 92,0 132,7 144,3
Source: Basualdo, E. (2003)
So, how did trade unions respond to this attack? To begin with, as the Partido Justicialista
(PJ)  was the historical  channel  by which the  Government  was accessed  and its  favour
gained by unions, the implementation of these policies required to deep the redefinition of
the  relation  between  the  State,  the  party  and  trade  unions.  In  this  sense,  trade  unions
continued to loss influence within the party and, therefore, the Parliament. Nevertheless,
direct confrontation of a Peronist Government implied the risk of political isolation and,
more importantly, breakage of the historical alliance that had provided unions with political
resources  and  had  served  their  corporatist  interests  well  so  far.  Once  again,  strategic
differences  led to a new division between those union leaders  wanting to  confront  this
departure  from  the  classic  legacy  of  Peronism  (the  CGT-  Azopardo)  and  those  who
supported  the  Government  (the  CGT-San  Martín).  The  government  repressed  by  force
every attempt to oppose privatisation,  such as the resistance by telephone (1990-1) and
railway workers (1991-2) restricting by decree the right to strike in public services and
utilities.  Moreover,  the government decided to cut off  wage increases to prevent a new
inflationary  crisis,  and  issued  in  1991  a  decree  linking  rises  in  wages  to  productivity
growth. Unions opposed this decision arguing that it limited actors’ autonomy in collective
bargaining but its consequences were much deeper. The decrees impacted on the whole
structure of collective bargaining by forcing unions to negotiate wages at firm level and to
take into account differentials in productivity between companies. They also constrained
corporative strategies by precluding demands for governmental wage polices. Thus trade
unions were obliged to discuss with employers how to increase productivity and concede
changes in the labour process that they were previously resisting. In 1993 another decree
would formalize bargaining at enterprise level; during 1995–2000, 90 per cent of collective
agreements were of that kind facilitating labour flexibility.
In the face of governmental determination to further the neo-liberal turn, hesitative unions
declined to form part of the opposition and the CGT unified once more its ranks in 1992,
and aligned itself with the Government. The subordination of the CGT to Menemism, and
hence,  to neo-liberalism ended up, however, in a new and more serious division of the
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labour  movement.  In  1992  the  CTA (Congreso  de  los  Trabajadores  Argentinos)  was
created,  mainly,  by  public  workers’ unions,  and  two  years  later,  declared  itself  as  an
alternative workers’ central. Also, in 1994 another split in the CGT led to the creation of the
MTA (Movimiento de los Trabajadores Argentinos) with the aim of recovering the tradition
of  Peronism to  oppose  the  neo-liberal  agenda.  These  three  workers’  organizations
corresponded, broadly, to three different responses to neo-liberalism over 1990s. 
The CGT gathered those unions (or union leaders) supporting Menem’s reforms in return
for business concessions. However, during this Peronist Government’s first term in office
(1989–95), only eight out of twenty legislative projects to reform labour laws were passed
in the Parliament.  Over this period, Peronist MPs with union backgrounds blocked in a
Labour Law Commission any legislative attempt to decentralise the collective bargaining
and make labour contracts flexible. Only after 1994, when a corporative pact was agreed
(Acuerdo Marco),  did  these  MPs stop blocking  the  projects  (Etchemendy  and Palermo
1998). All along, in order to introduce change, the government was forced to give exchange
protection and financial support to the  obras sociales, and permit unions to invest in the
new business opportunities brought about by the privatisation and deregulation of the health
system, pensions, insurance for labour accidents, and the privatisation of public enterprises.
This entrepreneurial unionism was discursively legitimized as a strategy to maintain union
structures  and  services  to  members  in  an  economic  and  political  context  in  which
modernisation of union politics was deemed to be inevitable (Murillo 2001). In fact, these
unions collaborated in the introduction of neo-liberalism. 
In turn, the CTA was a departure from the traditional model embodied by the CGT. The
CTA advocated independence from the State and from the PJ. The organization has been
demanding personería gremial since its conception (and denied by the Ministry of Labour
so far), while promoting a pluralist model of representation. Organizationally, the CTA has
developed new forms: it has a territorial body for the unemployed; it allows the individual
affiliation of workers; it implements direct ballots for all union posts, gathers workers from
cooperatives and promotes the organisation of disadvantaged groups. In this way, the CTA
became a main actor in the mobilisation against the neo-liberal agenda during the 1990s
promoting  coalition  building  with  social  movements  and  political  organisations.  By
promoting a kind of social movement unionism, the CTA enriched the traditional repertoire
of labour movement  action,  while  demanding distributive policies  and social  protection
(Armelino 2004). 
The formation of the MTA was more a tactic following the traditional divisions of the union
movement in nucleamientos sindicales, than a proper project to build an alternative to the
CGT. Its rationale can be found in the internal struggle of the CGT regarding how to react
in the face of  Menemism.  The MTA advocated  the opposition to governmental  policies
based on the national and popular traditions of  Peronism (Fernández 1997). This internal
struggle ended in 2000 after the electoral defeated of the PJ,  with the effective division,
once  more,  of  the  CGT into  a  dialogue-oriented  CGT (CGT  Dialoguista)  and  a  more
combative CGT (CGT Rebelde), the latter built upon the MTA faction.
In this  context  of atomisation  of the trade  union movement,  it  is  worth noting too the
emergence of the  Corriente  Clasista y Combativa (CCC), a minor Marxist  central  with
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influence in some regions, mainly in the north of the country and some weight among the
unemployed organisations (the so-called piqueteros).  
Despite  a  general  trade  unions  retreat,  if  measured  by  number  of  conflicts,  the  1990s
witnessed  bitter  and  active  popular  resistance.  In  the  privatised  public  industries,  the
processes of rationalisation and the closure of production sites led to job loss and strong
workforce  opposition.  When  company  restructuring  impacted  areas  of  the  country
dependent  on  one  productive  sector  (metallurgy,  oil  extraction,  sugar  cane  plantations,
among others), resistance translated into broader mobilisations involving the rebellion of
civil society as a whole, as in the case of the communities of Villa Constitución (province
of Santa Fe), Cutral Có and Plaza Huincul (Neuquén), and Tartagal and General Mosconi
(Salta).  In  all  these  cases,  trade  unions  played a  secondary  role.  In  these  conflicts  the
leading force were the piqueteros, whose organisations gradually occupied the centre stage
of  the  social  mobilisation  against  neo-liberalism.  By  the  end  of  Menem’s  second
presidency, however, union opposition grew. The CGT, the CTA, the MTA and the CCC,
called four general strikes in an attempt to block government efforts to further undermine
trade unions position in collective bargaining.  Yet,  the success of these demonstrations,
while it saved union prerogatives, neither changed flexibility at workplace level, already
recognised by the Acuerdo Macro, nor retreated the heart of neo-liberal reforms. 
Revitalization of trade unionism in the post 2001 crisis? 
Once  evaluating  trade  unions’ response  to  neo-liberalism  in  the  current  period,  it  is
important  to  re-emphasise  how  more  than  thirty  years  of  market  reforms  have  now
profoundly changed the structure of  the employment  in  Argentina.  Two indicators  may
illustrate these changes. While big industrial enterprise occupied 46 % of workers and small
and medium employed 15,8 % of the labour force in 1974, the former occupied only 18,2
% of workers and the latter employed 31 % of the labour force in 2002 (Chitarroni and
Cimillo  2007).  Concomitantly,  precariousness,  outsourcing,  flexibility,  informality  have
become structural components of the employment system. In 1974, 81 % of wage earners
were recorded in social security, whereas this figure fell to 63,4 % in 2002. This situation
has objectively shrunk the numerical and social basis of trade unionism, widening the gap
between protected and unprotected workers. 
However,  the steady economic recovery of the years 2003-2008 that  registered average
growth rates, which oscillated between 8 - 9 %, and government’s policies oriented to re-
establish a more traditional, consensual system of industrial relations, functional to social
stability,  have  certainly  favoured  trade  unions’ politics  and  mobilisation.  The  positive
economic  trend stopped the process  of  de-industrialization  that  characterised  the 1990s
(manufacturing  occupied  19,8  % of  the  labour  force  in  2006),  and  spurred  an  overall
dynamism  of  productive  activity,  which  manifested  in  the  corresponding  growth  of
employment,  particularly  in  the  private  industrial  sector  with  a  6%  annual  increase
(Kosacoff 2010).
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Table 3: GDP, real wage, unemployment and underemployment
Year GDP Real Wage(average)
Real Wage
(prívate sector) Unemployment Underemployment
2003 108.3 77,4 84.4 15.6 18.8
2004 118.0 84,3 96.2 14.8 15.2
2005 128.9 86,1 99.9 13.0 12.7
2006 139.8 91,1 108.6 11.4 11.0
2007 151,9 98,5 117.7 9,8 9.3
2008 162,1 108,5 - 8,4 8,2
GDP: 1993 = 100
Real Wage: Rate of January – 4º trimester 2001= 100
Unemployment/Undermeployement: 1º trimester
Source: Indec / Taller de Estudios Laborales: Informes Estadísticos 2007 and 2010
This  has  been  important  for  trade  unions  first  to  keep control  of  labour  intensive  and
historically  strategic  sectors  of  the  economy  (automotive,  foods,  transport,
telecommunication,  energy)  and,  secondly  to  use  this  renewed  strength  to  obtain
concessions and salaries’ increases in a moment of capitalist growing profitability. Through
collective  bargaining  and  industrial  conflict,  and  taking  advantage  of  the  favourable
economic situation, workers, particularly those employed in the private sector, have been
able to recover somewhat their real salaries. It is worth noting, however, that this recovery
followed a historic 34 % drop in real wages between October 2001 and October 2002 due
to currency devaluation. It was not before the last trimester of 2006 that real wages reached
the level previous to devaluation, which in itself did not correspond for workers to a period
of high level of wealth redistribution. 
The other aspect that explains the recently renewed political importance of trade unions in
influencing the employment relations agenda is represented by the explicit government’s
support and alliance with the more traditionally  Peronist sector of the labour movement.
This  support  has  been  expressed  in  various  ways.  Firstly,  by  encouraging  collective
bargaining at national and plant level and by summoning after ten years of inactivity the
Consejo del Salario Mínimo, Vital y Móvil, a tripartite body aimed to spread social dialogue
among different actors and to fix the minimum wage. Secondly, by an initial tolerance to
social protests, particularly, labour conflicts. This approach has gradually changed since the
second half  of 2005 with government  openly supporting the employers side and police
repressing striking workers in many occasions, the most violent being the recent eviction of
Kraft Foods workers factory occupation. Thirdly, by favouring the reunification of the CGT
in 2004. This was not just symbolical but it concretely represented a way of empowering
Peronist union leaders against the recrudescence of unemployed led social mobilisation and
the mounting rank and file pressure for salaries increases. In parallel with the reunification
of  the  CGT,  the  government  denied  the  personería  gremial  to  the  CTA.  This  decision
represented, in turn, a further attempt to control the overall level of social protest and, in
fact, favoured a conservative, sectional and functional view of workers’ organising. 
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Whether one considers the combination of these economic and political factors as part of an
explicit  neo-corporatist  project  that  sees the institutional  insertion of trade unions from
strategic sectors of the economy a condition for stability (Etchemendy and Collier 2007), or
as a part of the government’s attempt to gain hegemonic control upon the broader process
of  social  mobilisation  (Atzeni  and  Ghigliani  2007),  the  concrete  result  has  been  a
widespread increase  of  trade  unions  led mobilisations.  However,  these have differed  in
scope, nature and duration, with workers alternatively contesting or accepting, in exchange
for salary increases,  the neo-liberal  changes imposed in the structure and conditions  of
employment over the last thirty years. Thus, the case of trade unions’ resistance to neo-
liberalism in today’s Argentina should once again be seen in the light of the distinction
between unions as institutions and as movement (Cohen 2006).
Many would point  to  the fact  that  the Argentinean trade  union movement  has  recently
recovered  strength,  especially  if  compared  with  countries  like  Chile  that  went  through
similar processes of market reforms and liberalisation. While this is certainly true for the
aforementioned  reasons,  questions  arise  about  the  real  nature  of  this  strength  and  its
prospects.
In this sense, it is important to stress that the more radical breaks with neoliberal imposed
flexibility and precariousness in the workplace came from the self-organisation of rank and
file workers and not from a union top-down corporatist approach. Although scant, these
cases  have  been  important  for  setting  a  precedent  not  just  in  terms  of  their  concrete
demands  but  also  for  re-opening  in  Argentina  the  debate  about  democracy  in  workers
organising and representativeness, an issue crucial to any union movement future.
The struggles against temporal contracts in the telecommunication companies and railways,
outsourcing of services in the Buenos Aires underground, the implementation of the 12
hours shift in Kraft Foods and many other conflicts mainly driven by wage increases and
working conditions like those of Fate rubber tyre plant, Maffisa (textile), Stani and Pepsico
(food), Parmalat (milk), Paty and Tango Meat (meat), Praxair (chemistry), among others,
are just  some of the most well-known examples  of episodes in which workplace based
organisations  have  been  able  to  led  important  industrial  action  built  on  democratic
principles of representation and participation. While there have also been cases of struggles
for union recognition in previously union-free sectors, as with SIMECA (an independent
union affiliated  to  the  CTA that  organise  workers  in  the delivery  sector)  or  UTC (that
represents Bolivians in the maquila type textile small workshop of Buenos Aires), the main
processes of mobilisation were driven by the  comisiones internas, often in confrontation
with central institutional/bureaucratic leaderships. 
All these grass-root movements share some basic features. To begin with, most of them
took  advantage  of  the  rise  in  collective  bargaining  to  organise  their  workplaces.  The
majority of their leaders are young and without previous union involvement, though many
have passed through experiences of high turnover. In all these conflicts, Left activists have
played  a  leading  role  through  grass-roots  mechanisms  of  decision-making  and  intense
participation. As conflict turned bitter, workers resorted to direct action and violence. A few
of these conflicts  ended up changing worker representatives at  the workplace and even
trade  unions  local  structures  (Ghigliani  and  Schneider  2010).  It  is  important  to  stress,
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however, that many of these experiences failed to maintain the organization in the face of
the concerted attack from employers, union bureaucracies and public authorities. Still, they
have been the main workers’ attempt to reverse some of the most devastating aspects of the
neo-liberal reforms. At the same time, they contributed to open a public, though fleeting,
debate about trade unions organisational model and representativeness, the weight of union
bureaucracy and the lack of union internal democracy.
Notwithstanding the importance of these bottom up movements, due to the vertical system
of representation existing in Argentina, traditional leaderships have ended up conducting
the majority of conflicts in the recent context of economic growth. This contributed to the
partial recovery of real wages but did not threaten neo-liberal established standards in the
employment relationship as shown by the contents of collective bargaining, which have not
seriously challenged flexibility. Politically, the CGT discursively opposed neo-liberalism as
a thing from the past, supporting the Government and advocating the protection of local
workers. In turn, the CTA has insisted in his mobilising tactics with little success as shown
by the failure to obtain the personería gremial and broaden its presence in manufacturing
and services. Though, the main challenge to neo-liberalism over the recent years belonged
to  scarce  events  of  grass-root  activism,  which  are  still  too  weak  to  anticipate  a  real
alternative to traditional unionism in the near future. 
Conclusions
The  history  of  the  last  thirty  five  years  of  trade  unions  and  workers  responses  to  the
implementation  of  neo-liberal  reforms  in  Argentina  cannot  be  univocally  interpreted.
Firstly, we should consider the different phases, methods and political conditions through
which neo-liberalism has been introduced and later consolidated in the country. Secondly,
although general patterns of trade unions reactions  can be established for each of these
periods, differences have emerged between more confrontationists or more dialogue based
strategies but without these involving clear visions of society and the economy. In this
sense political pragmatism more than ideologies seem to have informed peak organisations
actions. Thirdly, following institutional, organisational and political features specific to the
history of Argentine trade unionism, we have seen how opposition to neo-liberalism has
been  the  product  of  both  grass-roots  and  top  down  workers’  mobilisations  and  of
institutional forms of exchange with the State. 
All  these  factors  have  combined  in  different  ways  depending  on  the  more  pragmatic,
ideological or politically driven motivations leading the strategy of trade unions, producing
groupings  and  temporary  alliances  more  than  unity  within  the  labor  movement.
Unsurprisingly,  this  is  probably  not  just  the  most  important  consequence  of  the
implementation  of neo-liberalism but  also its  own foundation if  we think that  since its
inception  neo-liberalism  was  associated,  particularly  in  Argentina  as  in  many  other
countries,  with  forced  imposition  and  destruction  of  the  labour  movement  power.  The
imposed consensus of the military government was later to be substituted by the financial
imposition dominating the structural adjustments of the 1980s and the massive reforms of
the 1990s.
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Following  global  trends,  the  imposition  of  neo-liberal  orthodoxy  has  produced  de-
industrialisation, de-centralisation of collective bargaining, reduction of the formal sector
and labour market flexibility which have undermined not just the role of trade unions as
progressive  social  forces  but  also  their  own  institutional  survival.  Judging  from these
outcomes, and notwithstanding workers’ resistance and oppositions to neo-liberal policies,
the conclusion is that thirty years of market reforms have put seriously into question the
ability of trade unions as institutions to resist change and channel effectively the bottom-up
grievances  and collective  mobilisations  that  the model  of  accumulation  associated  with
global neo-liberalism constantly reproduces. As recent developments seems to suggest, the
reconstruction of a political dimension in trade unions activity, which is fundamental to any
future resistance of the labour movement to changes associated with globalisation,  goes
hand  by  hand  with  processes  of  democratic  participation,  decisions  making   and
accountability of the unions to their members. Whether or not traditional trade unions in
Argentina will  be able  to move in this  direction will  strongly depend on abandoning a
reformist and corporatist approach in the defense of workers’ interests.
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